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This paper presents findings from a study of the co-
design of business processes and IT systems at the 
enterprise level. The findings suggest a punctuated 
equilibrium model of boundary-spanning design that 
is driven by a series of coordinating representations of 
the design problem-structure. These become more 
complicated as the design proceeds, adding new 
perspectives and dimensions to prior representations, 
and calling upon salient surface-structures that are 
helpful in conceptualizing the context of design. This 
finding challenges the notion of design as the 
exploration of deep organizational structures or as 
goal-driven design.  
1. Introduction  
Change projects involving the design of 
enterprise-spanning information systems (IS) create 
special problems for change managers as they 
combine the problems of spanning multiple domains 
or organizational practice – each of which has its own 
culture, values, and practices - with those of balancing 
business process change requirements with 
requirements for computer-based information systems 
design. While we may theorize boundary-spanning 
systems design as “the constant shaping of  
‘sociotechnical systems’ in the form of design 
requirements that are attentive to and reflect the 
emerging interactions among people, software, and 
technologies,” [1], this description fails to explain how 
we should approach boundary-spanning IS design in 
practice.  
2. Conceptual underpinnings 
Boundary-spanning design involves coordinated 
sensemaking across a variety of stakeholders and 
participants, each of whom interprets organizational 
problems and solutions according to their role in an 
intersecting set of participation frameworks – the 
professional practices, socio-cultural values and 
norms that govern work in various organizational 
knowledge domains [2]. Organizational IS design may 
be understood as an emergent change process, 
achieved through the gradual realignment of 
information systems to fit with emerging business 
strategy in response to changes in its operating 
imperatives and external business environmental [3]. 
IS design may alternately be conceptualized as a 
process of punctuated equilibrium, defined as periods 
when stable organizational structures constrain radical 
change, punctuated by brief transitions that introduce 
disruption and upheaval to the status quo [4]. Drawing 
on paleobiology, punctuated equilibrium relies on the 
idea that complex organizational systems are 
stabilized by some underlying order, or “deep 
structure” [5, 6]. Deep structure in organizations 
reflects political centers of power, socio-cultural 
practices and values, control-systems, and technology 
configurations [6]. It is  difficult to change deep 
structure because of the trail of strategic choices create 
a “sunk cost” imperative to justify the existing 
organization [4]. Deep structure reflects the mutual 
reinforcement that results from ongoing organizational 
enactment [7]. “The deep structure is what confines 
change during equilibrium periods to variations on an 
enduring theme – and it is also what ‘disassembles, 
reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation 
during revolutionary punctuations’” [4].  
Organizational participants interact with its deep 
structure through a “surface structure”, a set of 
features and interfaces provided by organizational 
information systems. These provide generative 
configuration mechanisms for organizational and IS 
design [5]. So we may conceptualize IS change as 
“complex, multi-level, episodic change where 
simultaneous processes interact creating unpredictable 
and dynamic change outcomes” [8, p.592]. The 
generative change needed for Enterprise System 
design may come about because of a continuous 
adjustment, as the surface structure provided by the 
system is seen as misaligned with strategic change 
imperatives – for example, the need for company vs. 
competitor sales reporting in response to increased 





competition in the marketplace. Or it may result from 
a series of episodes and transitions, which advance the 
design or reveal areas where the deep structures of 
organization been poorly understood [8]. The first 
research question thus explores the design process: 
RQ1: What process model best describe boundary-
spanning, information system design in the wild – and 
how does this operate? 
To understand how deep and surface structures 
are understood by IS design participants, I employ the 
epistemological lens of social cognition, where 
individuals employ cognitive frames or mental models 
that reflect their experiential knowledge (a.k.a. 
technological frames, when these are applied to group 
perceptions of the role, use, or impact of technology) 
[3]. Sensemaking in boundary-spanning collaboration 
is effected through the use of epistemic objects, such 
as design models and specifications that allow 
understanding to be explored through representation 
[9] and boundary objects that allow knowledge 
specific to one participation framework to be 
translated across domain-boundaries without design 
participants needing to understand every aspect of the 
participation framework of others [10]. A multi-level 
analysis is required as individual framing of design 
requirements may align or conflict with 
intersubjective (shared by the design group) frames, 
which may in turn be different than generically 
subjective frames that reflect group or organizational 
consensus (“what we all know”) [3, 7, 11]. “Organized 
sensemaking” occurs as actors collaborate on 
interpreting organizational structures and the changes 
required to make these work for the situation at hand. 
Groups of change agents jointly construct design 
frames through three stages of distributed 
sensemaking: (i) enactment, where participants 
perform a course of action that creates or reinforces 
organizational structures, (ii) selection of 
organizational narratives used to interpret the 
situation, and (iii) retention where frames that align 
with group perspectives are operationalized into 
methods for future design [7]. The second research 
question thus explores distributed sensemaking: 
RQ2: What is the process by which design team 
participants collaborate in framing, exploring, and 
agreeing design problems and solutions? 
3. Research site and method 
3.1. Research site 
The ethnographic study presented here explores 
the organizing and framing processes of a group of 
strategic senior managers engaged in the definition of 
financial and enterprise systems in a U.S. University, 
over a period of two years. The University is a private, 
4-year degree granting institution, well regarded in its 
region. It offers a wide variety of majors in Business, 
Communication Studies, Education, Fine & 
Performing Arts, Healthcare & Sports Sciences, 
Humanities, Social Sciences & Psychology, Natural 
Sciences, and Pre-Med. The University employed an 
Enterprise System that was used by many similar 
academic institutions, but which had not been fully 
implemented. Several functional groups, in particular 
Human Resources, were suspicious of the introduction 
of an overarching administration system, viewing this 
as an attempt to impose control over their group 
culture and existing practices.  
The Design Taskforce was assembled in response 
to a perception that the University’s Enterprise 
Systems (ES) were inadequate for financial 
management and reporting. Taskforce participants 
included all of the major organizational managers: the 
Dean of Academic Affairs, the Executive Director of 
Student Accounts, Director of the Office of Student 
Accounts, the University Registrar, and Associate 
Registrar, the Dean of Finance & Operations, the 
Director of Financial Aid, the Financial Systems 
Manager, the Coordinator of Special Projects for the 
University, the Director of Marketing, and the Director 
of Information Services. Ad hoc participation was 
invited from all actors and groups affected by the 
current area of operational focus and included a senior 
system analyst whose role was to formalize design 
requirements for changes to the Enterprise System. 
Taskforce members were involved in a collective 
process of Enterprise System redesign that had 
recently started when I was invited to join the team for 
the research study. They met monthly, to discuss 
issues and to define what requirements needed to be 
resolved by members before the next meeting. 
3.2. Research method 
I employed a participant observation approach to 
ethnography, over a period of two years. Initially, I 
observed and recorded meetings of the Enterprise 
Systems Taskforce, to acculturate myself to the 
content and context of the change initiative. I attended 
monthly meetings of the Taskforce, interviewed the 
regular participants to understand how they 
understood and defined project objectives, and what 
problems they perceived with defining a joint design. 
After the first two meetings, I met with participants 
again to map out the processes that they perceived 
should be managed by the Enterprise System. I 
explored the key decision-points where boundary-
spanning coordination was required across domains. 
These were used to suggest issues for discussion in 
group meetings. I interacted regularly with meeting 
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participants, discussing their analysis and activities 
between meetings, and reviewing progress with the 
Information Services Manager, who led the design 
initiative. During episode 6, I facilitated a systemic 
analysis workshop with the Taskforce, using Soft 
Systems Methodology (SSM) techniques to map 
suggested system solutions and employing a systemic 
problem analysis to explore problem 
interdependencies between workgroups [2]. The 
workshop involved the main participants and a number 
of influential decision-makers including the 
University President, in processes of problem 
surfacing and exploration. These were effective at 
achieving a shared perspective and resulted in a 
cohesive, shared model of the change goals, moving 
forward. Following that point, I attended meetings as 
an ethnographic observer until the Enterprise System 
change requirements were defined and implemented. 
4. Findings 
4.1. Framing change goals 
The main issue facing the Taskforce was how to 
manage the introduction of new degree programs. 
There was a wide variation in how participants defined 
the problem,  shown in Table 1. The only point of 
agreement across Taskforce members was that 
strategic planning was influenced too much by 
opportunities offered by community interest groups 
and international non-government organizations 
(NGOs). This was seen to lead to many of the other 
problems listed. Taskforce members tried – and failed 
– to define a cohesive set of processes and a supporting 
Information System that would resolve these issues 
without overly constraining the flexibility to serve 
local community organizations with rigorous degree 
programs that were tailored to their needs – a strategic 
University goal. The disruptions that led to agreement 
that the Enterprise System needed to be updated to 
support program creation and student enrollment more 
effectively was the realization that the program 
creation guidelines and program evaluation processes 
were not being used. Executive decision-makers did  
not plan new program designs around the credit 
requirements for students to qualify for Financial Aid, 
recruiters ignored enrollment deadline constraints in 
order to maximize their rewards (they were paid for 
the number of students recruited), and Admissions 
staff enrolled students at the last minute to ensure the 
financial viability of a new academic program. This 
led to the creation of a new ES Taskforce, to explore 
what changes needed to be made to the enterprise 
system in order to formalize, control, and coordinate 
program creation, admissions, and student enrollment. 
Table 1. Problem-Frames of Key Taskforce Stakeholders 





because strategic management is entrepreneurial, new programs are 
announced before the various administrative groups have time to evaluate 
the implications or prepare for program administration 
University Registrar 
& Admissions Mgr. 
administrative 
issue 
students are often recruited to programs for which no classroom location, 
instructor, or facilities are available 
Dean of Finance  an admissions 
management issue 
students are recruited at the last minute in order to ensure the program’s 





because strategic management is entrepreneurial, degree programs are 
scheduled at the last minute – these fail to meet financial aid eligibility 
requirements (e.g., the number of instruction weeks in  specific academic year)  
Manager of Student 
Support Services  
administrative 
issue 
Recruiters promise students that they will be eligible for financial aid, even 
when this has not been confirmed – the University needs to meet any 





programs include textbooks and computers in tuition costs, but there is 
insufficient time for these to be ordered 
 
4.2. Coordinating shared task goals 
The process-timeline for introducing a new 
program, shown in Figure 1, provided a coordinating 
object for the group design. This took the form of an 
abstract “script” to explore the work of various 
operational groups around a standardized calendar. 
The loose alignment provided by the timeline allowed 
members of each workgroup to attach their own 
information needs and procedures to the timeline 
without it conflicting with individual perspectives. 
 
Figure 1. New Program Process Timeline 
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Table 2. Coordinating Objects Used By Key Stakeholder Groups 
Stakeholder Group Key Issue(s) Purpose of shared student status spreadsheet 
Information 
services group  
Coordinating rapidly changing information about 
student and program arrangements that the 
Enterprise System cannot manage 
Order printed materials & reserve  rooms for 
classes in advance of formal registration 
University registrar  ensuring that students are registered in time for 
the degree start 
Update status as students complete each stage 
of application and registration 
Financial Aid Group  processing and validating financial aid 
applications prior to registration 
Check student eligibility for financial aid 
Financial 
Controller’s Office  
ensuring that the new program is economically 
viable in advance of its start 
Anticipate class size 
Information 
Technology  
Requirements analysis for changes to the 
Enterprise System 
Attempting to codify spreadsheet info. fields 
to define system functionality 
 
The process of agreeing which information needs 
would be met by the Enterprise System was 
contentious, with many group’s requirements being 
rejected by the Information Services Manager as “not 
related to program creation.”  Disruption to the group 
consensus introduced by this standardized Process 
Timeline arose when the model was proposed to 
faculty committees for use. Feedback from faculty 
demonstrated that the standardized timeline only 
“worked” to coordinate business processes because it 
excluded enterprise system workarounds employed by 
each group involved in implementing new programs. 
Various groups employed a local spreadsheet of 
student-status to track rapidly-changing information 
that the Enterprise System could not provide. This was 
updated with additional information by each group and 
maintained locally, so it contained inconsistent status 
indicators across the various groups using this 
information, as shown in Table 2. When the IT analyst 
collecting ES change requirements could not reconcile 
various workgroup versions of the spreadsheet, the 
Taskforce realized that they needed to formalize the 
information used to plan new academic programs. 
4.3. Defining shared program categories 
A Taskforce workshop was held to explore how 
the “big  picture”  of  program  administration  was 
coordinated across  all  affected stakeholder groups. 
Each group framed a number of special cases and 
multiple disagreements arose around which should be 
accepted as legitimate procedures. The aggregated set 
of special cases complicated the flowchart so much 
that no-one could understand the process flows. In a 
subsequent brainstorm session, Taskforce members 
brainstormed how to categorize the special cases. 
They converged on a solution of standardizing the 
format of new academic programs, by type. Taskforce 
members identified four different types of program 
calendar: Semester Programs, Certificate Programs, 
Quarter Programs, and Ad Hoc Programs. A new 
University Calendar, shown in Figure 2, was defined 
around these program formats. Start-date ranges for 
each type of program were defined and all activities 
required before a program could start were mapped 
out, to define the lead time required for program 
introduction and design for each category. The student 
accounts and financial aid groups were especially 
active in this episode, leading discussions about 
standardization needs and explaining their information 
requirements in great detail. When the standardized 
calendar was introduced, it appeared to have an 
immediate effect. Operations to coordinate work 
between groups were simplified. Student aid issues 
were reduced. The longer planning lead times were 
perceived as producing higher quality academic 
programs.  But as the administrative year proceeded, 
there appeared to be an increasing number of 
exceptions to these program formats. New exceptions 
were defined to accommodate legacy programs, or to 
meet the needs of specific community programs. 
 
Figure 2. The Process Timeline (Calendar) For New Program Lead-Time, By Category 
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The disruption to this episode of coordination 
around a standardized program format occurred 
because of increasing tensions between the regulating 
influence of the “standardized” program formats and 
the way in which new program requirements evolved 
to fulfill the community support aspects of the 
University mission. Many new programs did not 
conform to a standardized format and there was 
increasing dissatisfaction from strategic planners that 
University strategy was being impeded. Both the 
Executive Committee and the University President 
were pushing for an expansion of the University’s 
strategic plan to take advantage of opportunities 
offered by private funding agencies and to expand 
outreach to underserved areas of the U.S. This led to 
rising tensions around how it could be accommodated.  
4.4. Informal system boundary expansions 
After a series of major disagreements, the 
constraints of four standardized program formats were 
rejected. New programs were created that did not 
accord with these formats and that had shorter lead 
times than required for effective planning. The various 
groups represented on the Taskforce agreed that they 
would implement contingency procedures to deal with 
exceptions.  Taskforce approval of these contingencies 
expanded the business process boundary implicitly, by 
adopting a series of contingency procedures defined 
through short-term “interfaces” to external groups and 
systems. The implications of this expanding 
information system boundary were slow to be realized. 
The increasing complexity of operations was obscured 
by the information services group, who developed 
short-term workarounds for each group. They made 
phone calls to warn student services that action was 
required, provided interim calculations of student 
numbers to the registrar’s office, and fed student data 
to the financial aid office for aid application 
processing and to the financial controller’s office for 
planning purposes. In effect the information services 
group became a de facto coordination system, 
operationalizing the implicit frames of various 
Taskforce members to bypass the formal Enterprise 
System and develop workarounds to formal business 
processes based on the standardized calendar. 
The eventual disruption occurred with the 
realization that many new programs did not conform 
to the credit or delivery requirements agreed with the 
national accreditation board. The majority of new 
programs needed last-minute changes to the 
curriculum to conform with accreditation 
requirements. When the group mapped out planning 
procedures for new programs, they were shocked to 
discover how much more complex these had grown 
since the institution of the standardized program 
calendars. It proved impossible to model a set of 
standard procedures for the new programs. There were 
so many special cases that the director of information 
services observed that they were modeling “a calendar 
per academic program.”  The Financial Controller 
became concerned that the true costs of each program 
were not being accounted for and suggested they 
attempt to standardize accounting for program costs. 
4.5. A shared cost-reconciliation frame 
The Taskforce decided that the calendar approach 
to evaluating programs had introduced a false sense of 
security. They adopted a standardized form of 
program cost structure as their solution. The program 
cost structure embodied a key concern - that programs 
were being expanded without any analysis of the cost 
implications – but it also provided a framework for 
coordinated change. An activity-based analysis of 
indirect program costs was performed by each group 
involved. This revealed the shocking cost implications 
of various types of program expansion. Various 
Taskforce members volunteered to discuss cost 
implications with individual Deans, with strategic 
managers, and with other stakeholders, in order to 
manage the political and organizational consequences 
of standardization. An “informal cost structure” form 
presented a new coordinating object for the group, as 
various Taskforce members volunteered to investigate 
the costs of time and resources spent on ad hoc 
program workarounds. Taskforce members were 
continually surprised by the totals reported as they 
analyzed the detailed costs of their failure to 
standardize the University calendar. These totals made 
a huge impression on strategic managers - the 
University President instructed the Taskforce to “take 
control of the situation.” But it was clear that the key 
problem lay with executive decision makers, who 
continued to propose nonconforming, ad hoc 
programs. The Taskforce could reach no conclusion 
about how to deal with this. 
Disruption to the cost-reconciliation frame came 
with the news that accreditation was threatened by the 
failure of recent academic programs to meet 
accreditation requirements. The lack of conformity 
with calendar credit requirements, national evaluation, 
and quality criteria had led to pressure from a major 
undergraduate program accreditation board. There 
were several heated meetings, as Taskforce members 
debated how to manage the situation and who should 
take responsibility for change. In the end, the 
University registrar took control of the situation and 
met with the president to discuss how to manage the 
situation. 
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4.6. The power of external threats 
The Taskforce received instructions from the 
executive board to explore what needed to happen for 
the University to standardize around a single program 
calendar. Taskforce members now worked on a 
universal set of procedures that would formalize 
coordination across the various groups involved in 
program administration. The external crisis instilled a 
new sense of urgency and cooperation. Each 
workgroup defined changes to the Enterprise System 
that were required for coordination across domains. 
For example, the financial aid office modeled the work 
that they did, to justify their need for twelve weeks’ 
notice of individual student registrations prior to start 
of the academic program year. The Student Services 
group mapped out the multiple interactions between 
their processes and student registration status, to 
justify why they needed advance warning of student 
enrollments. Even when changes were not agreed by 
the Taskforce, they had established a much better 
understanding of others’ work processes and this 
assisted with negotiations. Standardized procedures 
and templates were created rapidly for new program 
planning, based on the Taskforce’s accrued learning. 
A “will not be approved without this” framing 
provided a motivating script for the framework! 
Disruption to the strategic planning and 
coordination frame came about when the introduction 
of the standardized program approval framework 
caused problems. Recruiters felt that they were being 
cheated of the opportunity to recruit late students, and 
compromises had to be made to keep them on board. 
Executive decision makers had to be reminded of the 
implications of abandoning the standardized calendar 
and procedures whenever they attempted to do so 
under pressure from community organizations to 
provide open-access programs. There were ongoing 
tensions between the needs of accreditation, 
conformance, and the University mission to provide 
open access to education. 
4.7. Surfacing misunderstandings 
Tensions between external threats and strategic 
goals were resolved by the Information Services 
director, whose group had devised the workarounds 
that had previously caused so many problems. They 
developed an informal cost estimation system (a 
detailed spreadsheet) that reflected the activity-based 
costs of introducing a new academic program, based 
on estimates generated during cost-reconciliation. 
Each time a new program was planned, the cost 
estimation spreadsheet was used to reflect the true 
costs of introduction. This exposed the costs of  
deviations from the standardized calendar formats, 
reducing these to almost nil. By disrupting the 
strategic mission frame (“open access requires 
responsive, ad hoc program creation”) with an adapted 
version of the cost-reconciliation model, the 
Information Services group was able to introduce a 
collective breakdown that made the group realize that 
they genuinely needed to formalize their “standardized 
program approval” procedures by defining changes to 
the Enterprise System design - which was why the 
Taskforce had been assembled. These enabled the 
Enterprise System to track formal program planning, 
manage new program administration, and to support 
the informal practices required for program planning 
and student recruitment to work. The external 
accreditation board was satisfied that the University’s 
programs were now stable and well managed. Student 
satisfaction also increased, as financial aid application 
was simplified and became more certain. Not least, the 
cost structure of programs was reduced drastically, 
providing major benefits to the University and 
allowing it to fulfill its mission more effectively. 
4.8. Meta-analysis of design processes 
The design project proceeded as a series of seven 
episodes, described here and analyzed  in Table 3. 
Episode 1. The first coordinating object provided a 
program proposal (document) template to provide a 
“bare bones” outline of the information needed by 
each group involved in the planning process. The 
template proved inadequate, as it was often left 
incomplete due to time constraints with submission. 
Episode 2. A revised coordinating object employed a 
timeline model to track the information requirements 
of new program planning processes by lead-time. This 
representation was selected to support the problem-
frame of ensuring that all groups had the requisite 
information to plan their work in advance of new 
program introduction. But it failed in practice, when it 
was discovered that each group had a different version 
of an interim student registration status spreadsheet, 
that allowed them to contact or account for students in 
advance of formal registration. The result was a 
conflicting set student tracking requirements, which 
were difficult for people from other workgroups to 
reconcile. Many were dismissed as not necessary, only 
to be reinserted when Taskforce members had a more 
integrated appreciation of how the program planning 
process needed to work across domains and time.  
Episode 3. Failure to understand the Enterprise 
System workarounds employed by each group led to 
the adoption of another coordinating object, this time 
representing the various categories of program 
planning and attempting to develop the timeline 
Page 5424
calendar model of episode 2, to account for these 
cases. The program categorization framework broke 
down when it could not accommodate all of the special 
cases needed for legacy programs, or emerging forms 
of open access degree programs. 
Episode 4. The program categorization framework 
was replaced by an attempt to model and formalize 
contingency procedures to deal with exceptions to the 
standard program categories. The coordinating object 
representation not only complicated the previous one, 
but also incorporated a new coordination and control 
mechanism, as contingency procedures were 
controlled by the Information Services group to 
centralize the coordination of new program planning. 
This was undermined by the realization that the 
centralized controls were creating even more work for 
administrators, as the new programs did not conform 
to accreditation requirements, triggering last-minute 
revisions to their schedule and delivery plans and 
increasing the cost of program creation.  
Episode 5. The group complicated their problem 
representation again, reframing the problem to capture 
the cost of system and process workarounds and 
compare it to an ordered planning process. The 
resulting cost estimates shocked everyone – the cost of 
workarounds increased new program costs 
significantly. The cost-reconciliation process revealed 
flaws in the assumptions underlying previous cost 
estimation structures, leading to several programs 
being abandoned before they were introduced. The 
cost-basis problem-frame was disrupted in this 
episode due to an external threat.   
Episode 6. The failure of new programs to conform 
with calendar credit requirements, national evaluation 
standards, and quality criteria had led to pressure from 
a major undergraduate program accreditation board to 
standardize program schedule planning. This, 
combined with the cost-structures uncovered during 
reconciliation of the informal and formal activity-costs 
during episode 5, led the Taskforce to return to a single 
planning calendar and timeline. They extended this by 
adding standardized processes to monitor and 
coordinate planning with executive decision makers, 
who were convinced of the need to conform to a 
standardized program design by the external threat of 
losing accreditation. 
Episode 7. The recognition by executive decision-
makers of the need for control and standardization 
permitted the planning processes to be formalized and 
integrated into the enterprise system. By now, these 
processes were well-understood across the various 
stakeholders and knowledge domains involved, so IS 
change requirements could be defined in detail from 
the standardized process and information needs 
defined in episode 6 and validated in episode 7. 
5. Discussion of findings 
5.1. Boundary-spanning design as punctuated 
equilibrium 
This section addresses [RQ1] What process model 
best describe boundary-spanning, information system 
design in the wild – and how does this operate? From 
the summary in Table 3, the design process fits well 
with a punctuated equilibrium model of system design, 
organized around coordinating objects that reflected 
an emergent understanding of the organization’s “deep 
structures” [4, 6, 11]. The coordinating representations 
and problem-frames employed in each episode 
indicate an emergent understanding of design 
objectives, scope, and deliverables, which was 
mediated by attempts to model surface structures that 
were salient to each episode of design [5]. The 
literature views disruptive critical incidents as largely 
resulting from external, environmental pressures [4, 6, 
8, 12]. But, with one exception, the critical incidents 
disrupting each episode of design were internal, 
resulting from a misalignment of the surface structures 
(represented by the coordinating objects created for 
collective framing of the problem-space) with 
organizational deep structures that were only partly 
understood by each individual. Each episode’s 
coordinating object model builds on the previous one, 
to provide a successively more complex model of the 
salient parts of the organization’s deep structure. The 
“complication role” of coordinating objects allowed 
them to coordinate group activity around a collective 
and distributed form of experiential learning, as 
various permutations of surface structure became the 
subject of design-group experimentation cycles, as 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Distributed Design Learning Cycle 
The exception to the internal source of disruptive 
critical incidents came when the University’s degree 
accreditation was threatened. This created immediate 
and radical disruption, that led to deep learning. 
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Table 3. Coordinating Objects Used By Key Stakeholder Groups 




New program proposal 
template constrains and 
regulates strategic 
management’s 
entrepreneurial activity  
Define templates, forms, 
and procedures for new 
program creation and 
implementation 
Standardize program 
creation &  student 
recruitment procedures 
Ensure student plan of 
study meets credit reqs. 
Create informal 
guidelines; New forms & 
procedures   
Eval. criteria defined for 
Program Review Cttee 
Disruption Program proposal in complete: (i) Executive decision-makers do not ensure program of study will satisfy 
accreditation/financial aid requirements before signing contracts; (ii) Recruiters ignore enrollment timeline 
constraints: faculty, rooms, book, computer orders changed at last minute  









improvisation in new 
program design. 
It also coordinates 
information flows 
between each group’s 
work processes. 
Identify program 
evaluation criteria:  
*Enrollment meets goals? 
*Meets accreditation reqs.? 
*Meets fin. aid credit reqs? 
*Student enrollment nos. 
confirmed early enough to 
arrange course logistics? 
Coordinate info. flows:  
Program goals & strategy 
 outreach  recruit 
 financial viability 
Curriculum  accred. & 
fin. aid reqs.marketing 
Recruit  admissions  
registration  logistics 
Formal timeline does 
not include student 
status info. required by 
various admin. groups. 
Attempts to formalize 
student status fails, as 
too many variations 
Disruption Collective realization that timeline only works when it excludes detailed logic of workarounds employed by 
each major domain group; Workarounds use student enrollment status spreadsheet defines lead-time 
for key decisions; require intermediate student status reports 





Program intro. processes 
modeled to integrate 
info. from each group’s 
informal work sheet; 4 
program types defined 
Define start-date ranges 
when each program type 
can meet accreditation & 
financial aid reqs. to define 
each program’s lead-time 
New program acceptance 
criteria now include start-
date and lead-time 
constraints for each of 4 
program types. 
Managed by defining 
deadlines for review by 
various committees or 
admin. groups.  
Disruption Program categorization framework breaks down when it cannot accommodate the special cases needed 
for many legacy programs, or the emerging needs of new community degree programs driven by University 








Info. Services Group 
communicates student 
enrollment & status 
changes to admissions, 
student services, 
registrar, financial aid, 
and financial controller  
What do we need to do, to 
ensure program conforms 
to accreditation, financial 
aid requirements? 
How do we assess 
program financial viability? 
The formal system of 
work-activity is expanded 
through short-term 
“interfaces” to external 
groups and systems to 
accommodate non-
conforming programs 
Info. Services group 
becomes de facto 
coordination system, 
bypassing Enterprise Sys 
Informal system: emails 
& phone calls used for 
calendar workarounds  
Disruption New programs do not conform to credit/delivery requirements agreed with accreditation board, need to 
be updated before introduction. Taskforce cannot integrate all special cases into standard calendar or cost 
model (need to model “a calendar per academic program”). 
5. Employing a cost 
reconciliation 
approach through 
an “informal cost 
structure” form  
Standardized cost-
structure provides a 
framework to explore 
info. & activity reqs. for 
new program. Activity-
based cost analysis 
accounts for indirect and 
direct program costs 
What are workaround 
costs for new programs? 
How much time/effort 
does each group spend to 
perform ad hoc work 
needed to ensure 
programs are financially 
and academically viable? 
Taskforce members 
investigate costs of time 
and resources spent on 
ad hoc programs. 
Financial controller 
calculates total costs of 
program planning 
revealing estimate flaws 
Informal cost structure 
replaces direct cost 
structure in strategic 
decision making, to 
account for real costs of 
new program 
introduction – total costs 
shock everyone! 
Disruption EXTERNAL THREAT: The failure of new programs to conform with calendar credit requirements, national 
evaluation, and quality criteria leads to pressure from a major undergraduate program accreditation board 
to fix programs, or lose accreditation status. 
6. Explore what 
needs to happen 
for University to 
standardize 
program mgt. 
around a single 
calendar 
Strategic planning and 
coordination around a 
single academic calendar, 
with two variations 
(semester and quarter) 
and a uniform start week 
for all programs 
Taskforce explores how 
workflows in one group 
create or resolve 
problems in other groups, 
resurrects ill-understood 
problem frames rejected 
in  earlier design episodes 
Taskforce maps out 
universal procedures & 
lead-times to coordinate 
formal and informal work 
involved across groups to 
create, evaluate, & 
manage a new program 
Formal procedures 
are codified to the 
extent that these can 
be incorporated into 
the formal Enterprise 
System 
Disruption Standardized program approval framework causes problems: Recruiters feel they are cheated of 
opportunity to recruit late students. Executive decision makers are under pressure from ext. community 








procedures & templates 
created for new programs 
and courses.  
Without conformance to 
these, programs will not 
be approved. 
Is proposed new program 
financially and 
academically viable, if we 
include the indirect costs 
and lead-times needed 
for workarounds to 
standard calendar? 
Direct & indirect costs of 
new program intro. 
estimated using activity- 
framework from ep. 5. 
Lead-times for planning 






cost estimate now used 
to predict financial 
viability of program. 
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Because this misalignment threatened the core of 
the organization’s deep structure (its ability to award 
degrees), resources at all levels were mobilized and the 
Taskforce was able to define new processes and 
standards very rapidly. One might argue that the rapid 
response resulted from the generative design enacted 
in previous episodes of distributed, experiential 
learning. Taskforce members had internalized the 
operation of the deep structures needed to coordinate 
business and information processes across domain 
boundaries, which allowed them to react quickly in a 
crisis. The difference in the magnitude of change and 
the rapidity of response might explain why major 
critical incidents are viewed as resulting mainly from 
external pressures [4,6,8,12] 
5.2 Multiple layers of framing interaction 
This section explores [RQ2] What is the process 
by which design team participants collaborate in 
framing, exploring, and agreeing design problems and 
solutions? The coordinated, distributed cognition 
observed here operated at three levels of analysis:  
A “primary generator” model. Darke, in her studies 
of architectural design  noted the organizing power 
exercised by an abstraction of the expected solution-
structure, which she termed the “primary generator” of 
design. For example, architects might agree that they 
were designing a ranch house. This provided a 
framework to coordinate the work that followed [13]. 
The generative framework was provided in this study 
by agreeing a collective objective of mapping out the 
processes of new academic program creation. Even 
though group models and individual requirements for 
these processes changed throughout the design, 
Taskforce members used their process model to define 
how administrative work was coordinated across 
organizational domains, permitting a division of 
design labor that was retained throughout the project. 
The primary generator framework appeared to mediate 
knowledge translations across the boundaries of each 
admin. group’s participation framework, by placing 
interactions within a known situation and sequence, so 
the design group could contextualize who-knows-what 
and who-does-what. 
Coordinating objects or representations. A series of 
coordinating objects, discussed above, reflected the 
current problem frame for each episode. Each 
coordinating object incorporated the problem-
structures of the previous one, complicating the 
structure to reflect an emergent design scope and 
boundary. These structures therefore appeared to play 
the role of epistemic objects [13], creating emergent 
models of reality that allowed misalignments with the 
deep structures of organization to be realized. 
Individual problem-frames. Individuals 
surfaced implicit frames that represented requirements 
for an IS solution frequently in design meetings. It 
soon became clear that these often conflicted with the 
group’s shared understanding of the problem-
situation. Debate around application of the current  
coordinating object exposed misalignments between 
internalized deep structures - understood only in part 
by individuals - and the surface structures represented 
in the fragmented requirements for a design solution 
that the group produced, resulting in breakdowns. 
A breakdown [15] occurs when our habitual 
practice – our seamless “being in the world” – is 
interrupted by the need to reflect on why things did not 
work as expected. “Breakdowns serve an extremely 
important cognitive function, revealing to us the 
nature of our practices and equipment, making them 
‘present-to-hand’ to us” [14, pp. 77-78]. The deep 
structures of a problem-situation are revealed only 
when we stop to puzzle over why a process or tool did 
not produce the expected outcome. While a 
breakdown is generally conceptualized as a cognitive 
(individual) phenomenon, the interaction effects seen 
here suggest that a collective breakdown results when 
design group participants simultaneously realize that 
their shared understanding is insufficient to 
incorporate all of their implicit requirements for a 
solution. At this point, they coordinate argumentation 
around an epistemic object that allows them to explore 
their concerns [9] while presenting a sufficiently 
abstract boundary object [10] that it can coordinate 
knowledge across the network of interlocking 
participation frameworks represented by design group 
members [2]. When disagreements reach a critical 
mass, such that group consensus around the 
coordinating object can no longer be relied upon, the 
coordinating object is complexified to incorporate a 
wider range of concerns, while still being defined at a 
sufficiently vague level of abstraction that it can 
operate as a boundary object to mediate domain-
specific participation frameworks [10]. Each 
coordinating object thus creates an expanded space for 
learning about the problem-structure that allows 
design participants to translate observed actions into 
the new systems of activity required [5].  
The model of punctuated equilibrium that results 
is shown in Figure 4,  demonstrating how three distinct 
levels of collective understanding interact to support 
the processes of boundary-spanning design. Collective 
breakdowns occur when a critical mass of dissonance 
forms around the coordinating object. Table 3 reveals 
that the realization of critical levels of dissonance is 
triggered by managerial reviews that expose 
operational problems in the design or by external 
threats to the organization. The subsequent process of 
reframing the problem-space is productive for design, 
as it complexifies the emergent group understanding 
through the distributed experiential learning shown in 
Figure 3 and the interaction effects shown in Figure 4. 
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 Figure 4. Layers of Framing in Complex Design  
6. Conclusions 
The contribution of this study is to present a 
model and detailed explanation of how boundary-
spanning, complex systems design proceeds through a 
process of punctuated equilibrium.  While interaction 
effects between individual, group, and generically 
subjective levels were noted by Drazin et al. [11] in 
their study of organizational innovation, this study 
presents exposes interactions between multiple levels 
of cognition within a  network of interlocking 
participation frameworks [2]. The role of surface 
structures as providing an interface to deep structures 
via Information Systems design has been noted in the 
design science literature [5].  These findings suggests 
that the individual framing of surface structures that 
occurs when implicit IS solution requirements are 
surfaced, plays a key role in collective learning, as 
these misalign with collective representations of  
organizational deep structures (coordinating objects). 
The collective breakdowns that ensue act productively 
by refocusing design attention on a more complex 
representation of the problem-space, that increases 
shared understanding of the design problem. 
The implications for research are that we need to 
explore interaction effects between collective and 
individual design-framing in more detail, to 
understand how a design group’s network of 
interlocking participation frameworks enables 
emergent, individual framing of (solution-space) IS 
requirements, in particular what indicates design 
closure. The implications for practice are that we 
might productively employ a spiral process model for 
IS design that intentionally triggers a collective 
breakdown in each iteration. In boundary-spanning 
design contexts, we need to move the emphasis from 
goal-driven design to problem-focused exploration, as 
requirements for the IS solution appear to “fall out of” 
process-iterations that build to provide a sufficiently 
complex definition of deep structures in the problem-
space for the design group to construct a complex, 
systemic solution. 
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